Introjection of fear - a significant change in human Autor tekstu: Weronika Kosińska
Historical anthropology suggests not only that transformations of fundamental human structure exist, but also that they range a historical period, which means that the cultural formations of human being are very deeply grounded.
According to the results of researches, such transformations in our cultural tradition took place once somewhere between Homer and Plato (especially in V century B.C.), and second time during the forming of the contemporary human.
In this paper, I will especially focus on two researches, concerning the first transition of human. They clearly show the importance of historical anthropology, as well as they contain a thesis about a peculiar
„introjection" executed on human kind.
First, I shall introduce the study by a German scholar, Bruno Snell. His research shows how the ancient human experiences himself. Secondly, I will give some critic of Snell's theory. Then, I will bring closer the thesis about
„introjection of feelings" formed by other German scholar, Hermann Schmitz. Works of both philosophers concern Homeric and Platonic anthropology. And finally, I will give some summary.
In his studies on the Greeks, Snell shows that from Iliad, through Greek tragedy and lyric, a peculiar transition of human experience and self-reflection took place. What he ventures to say is that „Homer's men had as yet no knowledge of the intellect, or of the soul, or therefore of many other things" [ 1 ]. Snell does not want to say that Homeric characters were not capable of joy or reflection, but wants to show that „they did not conceive of these matters as actions of the intellect or the soul; and it is in this sense that they did not know the two"
[ 2 ]. Thus, Snell raises the essential question: „What did the Greeks at any given time know about themselves, and what did they not (or not yet) know?" [ 3 ]
The thesis that there is a fundamental human formation profoundly different from ours, namely „the Homeric human", is based mainly on deep analysis of some Greek words, used by Homer. According to Snell, there is no one word for naming the human body as the whole. „Of course the Homeric man had a body exactly like the later Greeks, but he did not know it qua body, but merely as the sum total of his limbs" [ 4 ] — claims Snell. He also writes that Aristarchus was the first one who noticed a specific use of the word sÎma
(soma) by Homer. And so, soma was never used to refer to a living body, it rather meant the corpse; lifeless remains. Instead, the word
(demas) was his expression for the live body. But Snell doubts that this is true in every case.
„Demas, however, is but a poor substitute for 'body', seeing that the word occurs only in the accusative of specification. It means
'in structure', 'n shape', and consequently its use is restricted to a mere handful of expressions, such as:
'to be small or large, to resemble someone', etc." [ 5 ] — we can read in
The Discovery of Mind. Instead of using the word 'body', Homer has an inclination to use the word
'limbs', along with some others, i.e. chros or derma.
Snell makes a conclusion that the early Greeks did not, either in their language or in the visual arts, grasp the body as a unit.
Furthermore, there is no one word for the inner wholeness of human, as well as there is no central instance organizing human desires, aspirations and thoughts; there is a lack of will. In mental and spiritual acts we can discover the influence of external factors, and man is like the open target for many forces which impact on him.
When returning to the soul and intellect, we discover the same situation as in the case of the body. For describing the soul, Homer uses mainly three words:
ČĹÇŽ (psyche), ¸ĹźĚÂ (thymos), and
Psyche means the force which keeps the human being alive. „Homer says that it forsakes man at the moment of death, and that it flutters about in Hades; but it is impossible to find out from his words what he considers to be the function of the psyche during man's life"
[ 6 ]. Homer also mentions that the psyche leaves through the mouth, through the wound, and flies to Hades.
Thymos is introduced as the source of motion or agitation. Several times
thymos occurs with connection to death which is describes as a departure of the
thymos. This fact provoked some scholars to interpret thymos as a soul. However, Snell is not among them. He proposes to translate
thymos as 'organ of (e)motion' which justifies above interpretation of thymos as a soul. Accepting Snell's translation,
thymos in fact, among its other functions, determines physical motion, which allows us to say that the
thymos leaves the bones and the limbs. Nevertheless, Snell clearly denies that the
thymos exists after death. "It is true that there remain a number of passages in which
thymos is the eschatological soul which flies off at the moment of death; but in each case it is the death of an animal which is so described — the death of a horse (Il. I6.469), of a stag (Od. I0.I63), of a boar (Od. I9.454) or of a dove (Il. 23.880). I have no doubt that the origin of this usage was as follows: evidently people were averse to ascribing the
psyche, which a human being loses when he dies, also to an animal. They therefore invented the idea of a
thymos which leaves the animal when it expires." [ 7 ] — convinces Snell.
The difference between psyche and thymos seems to be fairly clear and trenchant. But yet, we cannot say the same about the line between
thymos and noos. While the thymos is said to be the mental organ which causes emotions, the
noos is responsible for ideas and images. Although Snell says that these two overlap in many aspects, he gives some examples which make the distinction between
thymos and noos sharper.
Ordinarily the thymos is something which puts man into action, but in
Iliad, I4.6I f., we can read Nestor's words: "Let us take counsel...if the
noos may accomplish anything". This quote suggest that thymos is here not necessary and fairly useless. Further, the sensations such as joy, pleasure, love, sympathy, anger, merely all mental agitation, were associated with
thymos. A lot of examples of using thymos in the above context can be found in
thymos may be used as the name of a function, in which case we connect it with
'character' and 'will'. As an example, Snell cites the words of Odysseus: "Another
thymos held me back" [ 8 ]. From given examples about noos we can separate different uses of this word. It occurred as
'to see', 'to acquire a clear image of something', 'thinking', and 'understanding'. Snell writes:
"Noos is, as it were, the mental eye which exercises an unclouded vision"
[ 9 ].
Therefore, noos covers what we can call mind, soul, or intelligence. The same is true about
Thus, Snell says that what we call soul, in Homer was split into three parts,
psyche, thymos and noos, defining each by the analogy of physical organs. He writes: "Our transcription of
psyche, noos and thymos as
'organs' of life, of perception, and of (e)motion are, therefore, merely in the nature of abbreviations, neither totally accurate nor exhaustive; this could not be otherwise, owing to the circumstance that the concept of the
'soul' — and also of the 'body', as we have seen — is tied up with the whole character and orientation of a language. This means that in the various languages we are sure to find the most divergent interpretations of these ideas"
[ 10 ].
Intervention of the Olympian Gods
The second observation about Homeric men is connected with their actions. Nowadays, we seem to believe that a man changes the situation by his act of will and by his own power. From what we can read in Homer, it has not always been like this. It is not hard to notice that the great heroes, Achilles, Hector, Odysseus, etc., do not effectuate their great acts with help of their own force and ingeniousness. Snell lays out the issue this way: „Whenever a man accomplishes, or pronounces, more than his previous attitude had led others to expect, Homer connects this, in so far as he tries to supply an explanation, with the interference of a god. It should be noted especially that Homer does not know genuine personal decisions; even where a hero is shown pondering two alternatives the intervention of the gods plays the key role"
[ 11 ]. So it seems that the gods are the ones who interfere into events, or all the time, or at the final stage.
At the beginning of Odyssey, the gods decide on the return of Odysseus; further, it is the goddess Athena who makes Odysseus
"polypragmatos" with her hints. In
Iliad we witness a quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles. Agamemnon uses his higher position and demands Achilles to bring along to him Briseis, Achilles' captive. This makes Achilles so angry that he is close to using his sword against Agamemnon. Again, at the critical point, the Olympian god appears. Athena appears to Achilles, holds him back and warns him. Achilles obeys the goddess and laces his sword back in the scabbard. „Homer, [...], could not do without deity. We might substitute a decision on the part of Achilles, his own reflection and his own incentive. But Homer's man does not yet regard himself as the source of his own decisions; that development is reserved for tragedy. When the Homeric hero, after duly weighing his alternatives, comes to a final conclusion, he feels that his course is shaped by the
gods" [ 12 ] — comments Snell. But Homer's audience did not consider this peculiar dependence of heroes as something bad, rather contrary, the Greek heroes were considered great because the gods performed through
them. The Greek god does not strike men with thunders up from the clouds; instead, like Athena in the mentioned scene, speaks to the hero: follow me, if you wish. And Achilles follows her, since he knows that when a man is in the state of anger, it is generally better to listen to the gods.
1 2 Dalej..
[ 1 ] Bruno Snell, The Discovery of The Mind, „The Greek Origins of European Though", translated by T. G. Rosenmeyer Harper Torchbooks / The Academy Library, Harper, Introduction xi [ 2 ] Ibidem, Introduction xi [ 3 ] Ibidem, Introduction xiii [ 9 ] Bruno Snell, The Discovery of The Mind, „The Greek Origins of European Though", pp. 13
« Filozofia (Publikacja: 13-12-2005 Ostatnia zmiana: 14-12-2005)
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Ur. 1983. Studentka filozofii na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim. Redaktor "Ekspresu Filozoficznego" (dodatek do czasopisma "Principia"). Pół roku studiowała filozofię w Nijmegen (Holandia). Zainteresowania: film, malarstwo, teatr, fotografia, filozofia (w szczególności antropologia filozoficzna).
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